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Introduction
Constitutionally enshrined socioeconomic rights are a topic of enduring controversy. Societies overcoming exploitive regimes in the twentieth
century have experienced popular demand for rapid economic and social
transformation.1 Even before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, emerging constitutional democracies debated the transformative potential of enforceable socioeconomic rights.2
Opponents of constitutionalizing socioeconomic rights have not disputed the need for transformation in such societies, but argue that such
rights are non-justiciable because they present pressing questions of social
policy best left to the democratically accountable actors in government.3 A
related objection proposes that judicial enforcement of socioeconomic
rights is dangerous to a system of separation of powers.4
This Note considers socioeconomic rights enshrined in the Indian and
South African Constitutions as written and enforced. Both the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (“South African Constitution”) and the
Constitution of India (“Indian Constitution”) were products of popular liberation movements against exploitive regimes,5 but the models of socioeconomic rights adopted in these constitutions and the jurisprudence of the
respective high courts enforcing these rights are vastly different.6 The dis1. See Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 451, 451– 52 (1992).
2. India’s constitutional debate involving socioeconomic rights, for example, was
contemporaneous with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948) (“UDHR”). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); Vijayashri Sripati, Constitutionalism in India and
South Africa: A Comparative Study from a Human Rights Perspective, 16 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 49, 60– 67 (2007). The Constitution of Ireland, upon which the socioeconomic
rights provisions of the Constitution of India are based, predates the UDHR by more
than a decade. Rehan Abeyratne, Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Towards
a Broader Conception of Legitimacy, 39 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1, 29 (2014); David Keane,
The Irish Influence on the Indian Constitution: 60 Years On, HUM. RTS. IR. (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://humanrights.ie/constitution-of-ireland/the-irish-influence-on-the-indian-constitution-60-years-on/.
3. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, A Constitutional Confluence: American ‘State Action’
Law and the Application of South Africa’s Socioeconomic Rights Guarantees to Private
Actors, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 21, 41– 42 (2001); Chris Sprigman & Michael Osborne,
Du Plessis Is Not Dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of the Bill of
Rights to Private Disputes, 15 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 25, 43 (1999).
4. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 3– 4; Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 464, 465– 68 (1992).
But see Sandra Fredman, Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to
Provide, 21 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 163, 168– 70 (2005); Haysom, supra note 1, at 456– 60
(responding to some of these critiques).
5. The Indian Constitution was adopted in 1950, three years after India achieved
independence from British colonial rule. Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 28– 30; Sripati,
supra note 2, at 56, 75. The South African Constitution was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in 1996, two years after the first full franchise elections after the
apartheid regime. Eric C. Christiansen, Using Constitutional Adjudication to Remedy
Socio-Economic Injustice: Comparative Lesson from South Africa, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 369, 378– 81 (2008).
6. See infra Parts II & III.
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tinct jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (“South
African Court”) and the Supreme Court of India (“Indian Court”) offer
unique responses to the objections leveled against judicially enforceable
socioeconomic rights, with illuminating implications for constitutional
legitimacy.
The comparative study of judicial enforcement of socioeconomic
rights in India and South Africa identifies tension between two important
considerations for the role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy.
On the one hand, judicial enforcement of rights should not unduly restrict
the space for balancing policy priorities through the legislative process. A
deferential or process-oriented approach to judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights best preserves this space. On the other hand, democratic
accountability requires that the public have some framework against which
to judge whether the government respects and promotes constitutional
rights. Courts can help to establish this framework by setting clear standards through adjudication of socioeconomic rights. The high courts of
South Africa and India have adopted distinct balances between these considerations. Both legal systems demonstrate, however, that judicial
enforcement of socioeconomic rights is both possible and immensely valuable. Part I begins with a brief overview of the debate surrounding socioeconomic rights in general and constitutional socioeconomic rights in
particular, and outlines a few objections to constitutional socioeconomic
rights. Part II provides background on the drafting of new constitutions in
South Africa after apartheid and in India after colonialism, and the debates
regarding socioeconomic rights. Part III describes how the highest courts
have applied socioeconomic rights in each country. Part IV considers the
implications of judicial enforcement for constitutional legitimacy, in light
of objections to constitutional socioeconomic rights. Finally, Part V suggests some lessons from a comparison of the two systems of judicial
enforcement with a view towards a model for enforcement of constitutional
socioeconomic rights.
I.

Background

A.

Early Controversy and International Calls for Constitutional
Socioeconomic Rights

Scholars hotly debated the wisdom of including positive, socioeconomic rights in emerging constitutions during the twentieth century. Ideological conflicts between democratic and socialist states during the Cold
War influenced the debate surrounding socioeconomic rights in general.7
Socialism provided some of the impetus for the early emergence of socioeconomic rights in post-Soviet constitutions,8 but the roots of the concept
of justiciable socioeconomic rights are also historically evident in the legis7. Mario Gomez, Social Economic Rights and Human Rights Commissions, 17 HUM.
RTS. Q. 155, 160– 61 (1995).
8. Wojciech Sadurski, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in Europe and the U.S. Bill of
Rights, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 223, 227– 28 (2002).
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lation and jurisprudence of western democracies.9
The development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”) and subsequent international instruments lent structure to the
international debate surrounding judicially enforceable socioeconomic
rights. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”) was responsible for drafting the UDHR between January 1947 and
December 1948, with the intent that it would serve as a model for emerging
constitutions.10 During the drafting process, the Commission debated the
inclusion of socioeconomic rights in the UDHR.11 Latin American delegations with socialist constitutions championed the inclusion of socioeconomic rights, with the support of other former colonies, including India
and a number of smaller states.12 The final UDHR contains a number of
socioeconomic provisions, including rights to social security, leisure,
health, education, and “just and favorable remuneration,”13 but as a United
Nations resolution it cannot be directly enforced against states.14
A number of constitutional documents drafted in the twentieth century followed the example set by the UDHR in enumerating positive socioeconomic rights. In addition to the South African Constitution and the
Indian Constitution (discussed in detail below), 158 constitutional documents now include more than one socioeconomic right,15 including the
constitutions of Germany (1949),16 Pakistan (1973),17 Brazil (1988),18
and Colombia (1991),19 although the possibility and frequency of judicial
enforcement of these rights varies widely.20
Opponents to the constitutionalization of socioeconomic rights were
quick to point out the difference between accepting a strong, transformative agenda through legislation and social policy, on the one hand, and
9. See Richard L. Siegel, Socioeconomic Human Rights: Past and Future, 7 HUM. RTS.
Q. 255, 256, 260– 65 (1985).
10. Sripati, supra note 2, at 60– 61. India was one of the original members of the
Commission and the process of drafting the UDHR occurred roughly contemporaneously with the drafting of Part III of the Indian Constitution. Id. at 61– 62.
11. See id. at 66– 67; Susan Waltz, Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small
States in the Construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q.
44, 63 (2001).
12. Sripati, supra note 2, at 66– 67; Waltz, supra note 11, at 55– 66 (describing the
role of less powerful states in the debates surrounding the UDHR, including socioeconomic rights).
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/
217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), arts. 22– 26.
14. REBECCA M. WALLACE & OLGA MARTIN-ORTEGA, INTERNATIONAL LAW 30– 31 (7th
ed. 2013).
15. Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in
National Constitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043, 1050 (2014).
16. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet
.de/englisch_gg/index.html.
17. PAKISTAN CONST.
18. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] (Braz.).
19. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.].
20. See generally Jung, supra note 15 (empirical study of judicial enforcement of
socioeconomic rights globally).
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writing socioeconomic rights into a constitution, on the other.21 Accepting
that transformative social and economic policies were necessary— both for
the legitimacy of a new government and in service of social welfare— opponents have nonetheless raised a number of objections against the constitutionalization of socioeconomic rights, and especially against judicial
enforcement of such rights.
B.

Objections to Constitutionalized Socioeconomic Rights

In an influential essay, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, Professor Frank Michelman identifies two objections to
judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights drawn from John Rawls’ concept of democratic legitimacy.22
1.

Democratic Objection

The first objection is the democratic objection: judicial enforcement of
socioeconomic rights restricts the scope of democratic decision-making.23
A single judgment may require the political branches of government to
adjust democratically developed policies or treat an individual beneficiary
or class of beneficiaries differently.24 Under this view, judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights raises two structural concerns. First, it
raises a concern for the separation of powers between the judicial branch
and the democratic branches, because it allows courts to invalidate choices
as to allocation of resources that are fundamentally political.25 Second,
enforcement of socioeconomic rights raises a concern of judicial capacity
because judges are not the best-placed state actors to weigh potential policy
options and choose between priorities.26 Judges arguably lack the research
capacity and democratic accountability of legislators and executive
officers.
Taken to its most extreme conclusion, the democratic objection suggests that extensive judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights could
render democracy meaningless.27 A full body of constitutional jurisprudence enforcing socioeconomic rights could entirely fill the space of social
policy, tying the hands of elected politicians.28
21. See Sadurski, supra note 8, at 228– 29.
22. Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21, 21– 24, 35– 38
(Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007). Rawls’ “liberal principle of legitimacy” holds that coercive political power is legitimate only if “exercised in accordance
with a constitution . . . which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the
light of their common human reason.” JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT
41 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
23. Michelman, supra note 22, at 23.
24. Id. at 33.
25. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 18– 19.
26. See id.
27. See Michelman, supra note 22, at 32– 33.
28. See id.
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Professor Michelman responds to these objections by pointing out that
socioeconomic rights need not be written— or interpreted— so broadly.
States may draft socioeconomic rights as obligations for the state to pursue
gradual, progressive realization, rather than as absolute individual rights,
providing greater policy flexibility.29 Socioeconomic rights may serve to
shape outer bounds of policy decisions without negating space for democratic priority setting.30
2.

Contractarian Objection

The second general objection is the contractarian objection: fulfillment of socioeconomic rights is difficult to measure, frustrating citizens’
abilities to assess adherence to the state’s constitutional obligations.31 The
indeterminacy of the degree of achievement of socioeconomic rights makes
it impossible for citizens to judge whether political policy choices respect
or violate their rights.32 This could lead to a perceived failure of democratic legitimacy because citizens are not fully informed about the performance of their political leaders.33
Professor Michelman suggests that this objection, too, may be overcome.34 Although reasonable citizens may differ in their assessments of
the realization of a socioeconomic right, they may be able to agree on a
range of acceptable policy choices and procedures for assigning priorities.35 If reasonable citizens see constitutional socioeconomic rights as creating bounds on the acceptable policy space, then they may assess the
extent to which legislators have kept within that space with relative ease.36
II.

Framing Constitutional Socioeconomic Rights in South Africa and
India

The constitutional projects of post-colonial India and post-apartheid
South Africa both elicited debate regarding the transformative potential of
socioeconomic rights.37 The Constituent Assembly of India sought advice
from international jurists to frame its transformative goals, while the South
African Constitutional Assembly formally banned input from foreign commentators but actively sought public participation as part of a broad campaign to seed the values of constitutionalism.38
29. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 20– 21; Michelman, supra note 22, at 31– 33
30. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 20– 22.
31. See Michelman, supra note 22, at 23, 35– 36.
32. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 22– 26.
33. See id. at 24.
34. See Michelman, supra note 22, at 37– 38.
35. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 24 (citing Michelman, supra note 22, at 37– 39).
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Haysom, supra note 1, at 456– 60 (outlining and responding to objections to socioeconomic rights during the early days of constitutional debate).
38. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 29– 30 (describing the influence of Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court on the Indian Constituent Assembly); Sripati, supra
note 2, at 88 (international advisors formally banned from the debate of the South African Constitutional Assembly).
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The Indian Constitution

Rhetorically powerful demands for socioeconomic rights unified the
Indian National Congress (“INC”), creating the historical context for socioeconomic rights in the Indian Constitution.39 The INC published the
Karachi Resolution in 1931, in which it declared the necessity of socioeconomic rights for a post-colonial project of transformation.40 The Karachi
Resolution declared that, “in order to end the exploitation of the masses,
political freedom must include the real economic freedom of the starving
millions.”41
In the years leading to independence, however, India’s Constituent
Assembly hotly debated the wisdom of making socioeconomic rights judicially enforceable.42 The Sapru Report, published shortly before the Constituent Assembly began the project of drafting the Indian Constitution,
outlined a system of fundamental rights intended to protect minority
groups in a post-colonial society.43 The Sapru Report drew a distinction
between judicially enforceable rights and other rights that helped to frame
the debate that followed.44
During the drafting of the Indian Constitution, B. N. Rau, Constitutional Adviser to the Constituent Assembly, suggested including socioeconomic policy goals without justiciable rights.45 Rau was influenced by the
Irish constitutional model of Directive Principles of State Policy, and by
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who believed that socioeconomic rights were beyond the competence of courts.46 Some on the Drafting Committee thought that Rau’s suggestions did not go far enough to
ensure social and economic transformation; their contributions reflected
socialist theory and a belief that the survival of the new state required
rapid socioeconomic transformation.47 Ultimately, the Constituent
Assembly preferred Rau’s suggestion, and adopted a constitution with judicially enforceable political and civil Fundamental Rights48 and expressly
non-justiciable Directive Principles of socioeconomic policy.49 Article 32
created a cause of action for violations of Fundamental Rights; by contrast,
Article 37 declares the Directive Principles non-justiciable.50
39. See Sripati, supra note 2, at 63– 65.
40. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 27.
41. Id. (quoting GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A
NATION 56 (1966)).
42. Id. at 27– 31.
43. Id. at 27.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 27– 28.
46. Id. at 28– 30.
47. Id.
48. See INDIA CONST. Part III.
49. See id. at Part IV.
50. Compare id. at art. 32 (guaranteeing “[t]he right to move the Supreme Court by
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by [Part III]” and
authorizing, among other remedies, “habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto, and certiorari”), with id. at art. 37 (“The provisions contained in [Part IV] shall not
be enforced by any court.”).
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Despite this limitation, the Supreme Court of India has expanded the
enforceability of Fundamental Rights to enforce the obligations created by
the Directive Principles as well.51 Section III, below, will discuss the development of this jurisprudence.
B.

The South African Constitution

South Africa’s constitutional project developed in three stages. During
the first stage, South Africa adopted an interim constitution to guide the
constitutional drafting process.52 The second stage involved the drafting
of the constitution by the Constitutional Assembly.53 The final stage
required certification by the Constitutional Court of South Africa.54
The first stage involved a Multi-Party Negotiating Process between the
old regime and the African National Congress (“ANC”), resulting in an
interim constitution and a set of constitutional principles.55 During this
stage, the Multi-Party Negotiating Process adopted procedural guidelines
for the drafting process and principles that the parties agreed would be
binding on the final constitution.56 The interim constitution included a
“sunset clause,” which provided a five-year power sharing system between
the old and new regimes and the new to alleviate fear of reprisals against
the white minority and political leaders of apartheid.57
The second stage of the constitutional project began with South
Africa’s first full-franchise elections in 1994.58 The country elected a new
parliament, which would double as the Constitutional Assembly.59 The
Constitutional Assembly considered the legal status of socioeconomic
rights, which it recognized as political imperatives.60 A series of papers
circulated in the early 1990s by Albie Sachs— later Justice of the Constitutional Court— called for a strong system of enforceable socioeconomic
rights:
[T]he danger exists in our country as in any other, that a new elite will
emerge which will use its official position to accumulate wealth, power and
status for itself. The poor will remain poor and the oppressed oppressed
[sic]. The only difference would be that the poor and powerless will no
longer be disenfranchised, that they will only be poor and powerless and
51. See generally Abeyratne, supra note 2 (arguing that the Indian Court has
exceeded the intended scope of judicial enforcement of Part IV).
52. See Sripati, supra note 2, at 83– 84.
53. See id. at 84– 85.
54. Certification by the Court was required by the terms of the interim constitution.
See id. at 83, 85– 86.
55. Id. at 83– 84.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 84.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. The transformative potential of socioeconomic rights was an established theme
in the ANC’s internal debate. For example, the 1955 Freedom Charter, a foundational
document, declared rights to housing, health care, public utilities, and recreation,
among others. See Christiansen, supra note 5, at 378– 79.
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that instead of racial oppression we will have nonracial oppression.61

Substantively, Sachs proposed a minimum core model of individual entitlements similar to the model advocated by the United Nations Committee on
Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights.62
Sachs did not, however, favor the enforcement of socioeconomic rights
by ordinary courts.63 Instead, he suggested a system of independent commissions with broad mandates, made up of highly qualified experts,
reflecting a deep distrust of a judiciary that had proven willing to bend the
law in support of the apartheid regime.64 He wrote:
In South African conditions, it is unthinkable that the power to direct the
process of affirmative action should be left to those who are basically hostile
to it. In later years, when the foundations of a stable new nation have been
laid and when its institutions have gained habitual acceptance, it may be
possible to conceive of a new-phase Bill of Rights interpreted and applied by
a “mountaintop” judiciary. At present the great deed is to give people confidence in Parliament and representative institutions, to make them feel that
their vote really counts and that Parliamentary democracy serves their
interests.

The Constitutional Assembly rejected the suggestion of a minimum
core model and ultimately adopted a progressive model of socioeconomic
rights,65 obliging the government to “take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within . . . available resources, to achieve . . . progressive realization . . . ,” but without minimum individual entitlements.66 It abandoned
the minimum core model in light of concerns about the practicality of
immediately achieving those rights.67
In the third and final stage of South Africa’s constitutional project, the
debate continued before the Constitutional Court at the certification
stage.68 Opponents raised three objections to socioeconomic rights: (1) a
61. Dennis Davis, Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: The Record After Ten Years, 2
N.Z. J. PUB. INT’L L. 47, 48 (2004) (quoting ALBIE SACHS, ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
SOUTH AFRICA xi (1993)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 49.
64. Id.
65. See Christiansen, supra note 5, at 382.
66. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 26(2) (progressive realization of right to housing), 27(2) (health care, food, and social security), 29(2) (education).
67. Compare Davis, supra note 61, at 48– 50, and Minister of Health v. Treatment
Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at paras. 34– 35 (S. Afr.) (“[T]he socio-economic
rights of the Constitution should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that
the minimum core be provided to them . . . . All that is possible, and all that can be
expected of the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to . . . socioeconomic
rights identified in [the Constitution] on a progressive basis.”), with Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 13 - The Right to
Education, U.N. DOC E/C.12/1999/10, para. 57 (1999) (interpreting the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ article 13 right to education as
imposing a minimum core on member states), and Katharine G. Young, The Minimum
Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113,
113– 75 (2008).
68. See Raylene Keightley, The Challenges of Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South
Africa, 2011 N.Z. L. REV. 295, 298 (2011).
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lack of universal consensus regarding the content of such rights; (2) the
danger that judicial enforcement would violate the principle of separation
of powers by requiring the judiciary to encroach upon economic and social
policy decisions; and (3) the limited competence of courts to assess policy
decisions and assign priorities to conflicting imperatives.69
The Constitutional Court rejected each of these objections.70 It held
that enforcement of socioeconomic rights would not create a significantly
greater danger to the separation of powers than enforcement of political
rights like the rights to due process and free expression, which occasionally require a similar type of review of social and economic policy.71
While recognizing concerns about courts’ competence to measure and
reach optimal social and economic policy, the Court declared: “Nevertheless, we are of the view that these rights are, at least to some extent,
justiciable.”72
III.

Judicial Enforcement of Socioeconomic Rights in South Africa and
India

The Constitutional Court of South Africa and the Supreme Court of
India have developed divergent jurisprudence regarding socioeconomic
rights. The South African Court, with the clearer constitutional mandate
for judicial enforcement, has afforded deference to legislative and executive
policy choices within the bounds of reasonableness, reflecting the progressive approach adopted by the Constitutional Assembly.73 By contrast, the
Indian Court has read the provision for enforcement of Fundamental
Rights expansively to enforce socioeconomic rights enumerated under the
Directive Principles of State Policy, while simultaneously relaxing procedural and standing barriers to enforcement by individual claimants.74
A.

Enforcement in India

The Indian Court’s expansion of enforceable socioeconomic rights
began after the period of Emergency Rule (1975– 77) during which Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi sought to weaken judicial review.75 Following Gandhi’s conviction by the Allahabad High Court in 1975 for election fraud in
connection with the 1971 general elections, she declared a state of emer69. See Davis, supra note 61, at 50.
70. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4)
SA 744 (CC) at paras. 76– 78 (S. Afr.).
71. See id. at para. 77 (“In our view it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon the Courts so different from
that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of rights that it results in a breach of the
separation of powers.”).
72. Id. at para. 78.
73. See Fredman, supra note 4, at 180– 82; Tara Usher, Adjudication of Socio-Economic
Rights: One Size Does Not Fit All, 1 U.C. LONDON HUM. RTS. REV. 155, 168– 69 (2008).
74. See Usher, supra note 73, at 165– 68. Article 32 provides significant discretion to
the Court to adopt “appropriate proceedings” for the enforcement of Fundamental
Rights. INDIA CONST. art. 32.
75. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 37– 39.
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gency allowing her to rule by executive decree, suspended habeas corpus,
and restricted freedom of the press.76
Even before the period of emergency rule, Prime Minister Gandhi
demonstrated hostility to judicial review. In Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala (1973),77 the Indian Court held that amendments
to the Indian Constitution were invalid if they violated the “basic structure”
of the Constitution.78 In response, Gandhi violated tradition by appointing
her own nominee, who had dissented in Kesavananda, as Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court.79
During emergency rule, Prime Minister Gandhi passed four controversial constitutional amendments designed to limit judicial scrutiny of government action.80 The Forty-second Amendment overruled Kesavananda
by prohibiting the Court from reviewing constitutional amendments,
required a two-thirds vote of the Court to invalidate statutes as unconstitutional, and declared the 1971 election to be beyond judicial review altogether.81 The Forty-second Amendment also gave the socioeconomic
Directive Principles in Part IV of the Indian Constitution precedence over
the Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution, authorizing authoritarian socialism and resulting in the detention of political opponents.82
Following restoration of democratic procedures with the election of
the Janata Party in 1977 and repeal of the controversial constitutional
amendments,83 the Court decided a number of landmark cases extending
judicial review into the realm of socioeconomic rights.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978),84 the Court held that the
state’s confiscation of Ms. Gandhi’s passport without sufficient “procedure
established in law” violated her Fundamental Right to personal liberty85 as
well as natural justice, where the Passport Act provided no recourse or
opportunity for a hearing.86 In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of
Delhi (1981),87 the Court expanded the Fundamental Rights to life and
personal liberty88 to include the right of a detainee to “live with human
dignity,” including “the bare [necessities] of life.”89 Finally, the Court
76. Id.
77. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461
(India).
78. Id. at paras. 316– 17.
79. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 37– 38.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621 (India).
85. This right is guaranteed by Article 21 and enforceable pursuant to Article 32.
INDIA CONST. arts. 21, 32.
86. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621, 664 (India) (quoting INDIA
CONST. art. 21).
87. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 SCR 516 (India).
88. Guaranteed by Article 21 and enforceable pursuant to Article 32. INDIA CONST.
arts. 21, 32.
89. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 SCR 516, 529
(India). See Usher, supra note 73, at 165– 66.
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explicitly associated the right to life with the socioeconomic Directive Principles in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1983),90 explaining that
the “right to live with human dignity, enshrined in Article 21[,] derives its
life breath from the Directive Principles.”91
The Court simultaneously relaxed procedural and standing barriers to
public interest litigation. The Court believed these reforms were necessary
“because the very purpose of the law . . . was undergoing a transformation.
It was being used to foster social justice by creating new categories of
rights.”92 In S.P. Gupta v. President of India (1981),93 the Court abandoned common law concepts of locus standi to allow anyone to bring a
claim on behalf of a “person [who] by reason of poverty . . . or socially or
economically disadvantaged position” cannot bring a claim themselves.94
For example, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1983),95 the
Court allowed a public interest organization to challenge the constitutionality of bonded labor, and encouraging the government to affirmatively
welcome public interest litigation.96
The Court has also taken an expansive approach to its own role in
enforcing socioeconomic rights. For example, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha,
the Court not only ordered the state to release bonded laborers but also
required the state to ensure that laborers earn a minimum wage in the
future.97 At times, the Court’s judgments have approached full-scale policymaking. One extreme example is the “Right to Food” Litigation (2003)98
in which the Court declared a duty on the part of the state to provide emergency nutrition99 and issued forty-nine various interim orders between
2001 and 2005 implementing its judgment at a detailed level of social policy, touching on everything from school lunches to accountability.100
90. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCR 67 (India).
91. Id. at 103.
92. Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 45 (quoting P. P. Craig & S. L. Deshpande, Rights,
Autonomy and Process: Public Interest Litigation in India, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 356,
361 (1989)).
93. S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 SCR 365 (India).
94. Id. at para. 17.
95. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCR 67 (India).
96. Id. at 101– 04; see also S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 SCR 365 at
paras. 16– 17 (India) (allowing a claim challenging government interference with the
judiciary over the government’s objection that the claim was not brought by the judges
themselves).
97. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCR 67, 136– 37 (India).
98. See People’s Union for Civil Liberties (“PUCL”) v. Union of India, Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India) and subsequent interim orders at http://www.righttofood
india.org/case/case.html.
99. See Interim Order of May 2, 2003, PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 196 (2001) (India), http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/may203.html (ordering distribution of ration cards to vulnerable individuals and families).
100. See Supreme Court Order of Nov. 28, 2001, PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India), http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/nov28
.html (ordering introduction of cooked midday meals at all government primary
schools); Supreme Court Order of Oct. 1, 2008, PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India), http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders
.html#box19 (directing the judge-led Wadhwa Commission to extend its review of food
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Enforcement in South Africa

The Constitutional Court of South Africa has allowed greater discretion to policymakers and demonstrated greater deference to policy choices.
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (1997)101 was the first
case before the Constitutional Court in which a private individual sought
to enforce constitutional socioeconomic rights.102 The claimant challenged a hospital policy prioritizing curable cases for publicly-funded dialysis treatment at the expense of terminal cases such as his. The Court held
that the policy was reasonable in light of the limited resources available for
health services, and it did not violate the constitutional right to emergency
healthcare.103
The Court added substantive limits to this deference for reasonable
policy choices in Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2000).104 There,
the Court required the government to implement a “coherent . . . program[ ] directed towards the progressive realization of [a constitutional]
right . . . within the state’s available means. The program[ ] must be capable of facilitating the reali[z]ation of the right.”105 The Court held that a
government housing project violated this obligation because it failed to prioritize assistance to those “living in intolerable conditions or crisis
situations.”106
The Court added a procedural dimension to the reasonableness standard of review in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of
Johannesburg (2008),107 requiring the government to engage in good-faith
consultations with the community before pursuing evictions, and take
resulting homelessness into consideration.108
The Court has occasionally granted judgments against the state while
refusing to award individual remedies to successful litigants, reinforcing an
understanding of socioeconomic rights in South Africa as creating obligations for the government to pursue progressive realization rather than
achieve individual entitlements.109 For example, in Grootboom, the Court
declared a housing policy unconstitutional and required the government to
revise it, but denied immediate or direct relief to claimants.110 In Nokotyaid programs nationally); Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 48– 51; see also Legal Action:
Supreme Court Orders, RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/
orders/interimorders.html (listing and describing interim orders) (last visited Aug. 19,
2016).
101. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.).
102. See Davis, supra note 61, at 51.
103. See id.
104. Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
105. Id. at para. 41.
106. Id. at para. 99(2)(b).
107. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA
208 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Christiansen, supra note 5, at 384– 85.
108. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) at paras. 16– 22 (S. Afr.).
109. See Christiansen, supra note 5, at 384– 85.
110. See Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 99 (S.
Afr.).
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ana v. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (2009),111 the Court held that
the government’s failure to reach a final decision to improve an informal
settlement violated residents’ rights to adequate housing, but deferred to
the government’s proposed plan to review and remedy the situation and
refused to grant monetary relief to individual claimants.112 Nonetheless,
an exception to this reluctance to grant individual remedies appears to
apply where statute expressly provides an individual entitlement, and the
entitlement is withheld in a manner deemed to violate a constitutional
right. In Njongi v. Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape (2008),113 for
example, the Court called the cancellation of a disabled woman’s benefits
without notice or explanation “devoid of all humanity,” and ordered restoration of her benefits.114
IV.

Consequences of Socioeconomic Rights for Constitutional
Legitimacy in South Africa and India

Viewed in a historical context, guarantees of socioeconomic transformation were a prerequisite for constitutional legitimacy in both South
Africa and India immediately after liberation. Judicial enforcement of
these guarantees, however, was not a foregone conclusion and was hotly
debated in both countries.115 Divergent models for framing socioeconomic rights and for judicial interpretation may have implications for
enduring perceptions of constitutional legitimacy.
A.

The Democratic Objection

The first Rawlsian objection to constitutional socioeconomic rights
identified by Michelman is the risk that expansive judicial enforcement of
socioeconomic rights will restrict the substantive scope for democratic
decisionmaking.116
The Indian Court’s detailed decisions directing social and economic
policy, such as the interim orders in the “Right to Food” Litigation,117 cer111. Nokotyana v. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
112. Id. at paras. 48– 49, 54– 57; see also Redson Edward Kapindu, The Desperate Left
in Desperation: A Court in Retreat— Nokotyana v. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality
Revisited, 3 CONST. CT. REV. 201, 206– 212 (2010) (discussing procedural complexities
of Nokotyana); Keightley, supra note 68, at 315.
113. Njongi v. Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (4) SA 237 (CC) (S. Afr.).
114. Id. at paras. 90, 92(7).
115. But see Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority
Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467,
487– 90 (1983) (making the compelling argument that civil and socioeconomic rights
are not really dichotomous, because minimum socioeconomic standards are required to
exercise civil rights).
116. See Michelman, supra note 22, at 23; see also Mureinik, supra note 4, at 465– 67.
117. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India) and
subsequent interim orders, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html; Abeyratne,
supra note 2, at 50– 51; see also Legal Action: Supreme Court Orders, RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html (listing and describing interim orders).
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tainly restrict the scope remaining for democratic policymaking in affected
areas. Expansive judgments directing policy go to the core of the democratic objection to judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights. The
Court’s directives, if enforced in good faith, restrict the ability of the state
to make democratic decisions about how to prioritize various aspects of
socioeconomic development and assign limited resources. Although access
to basic nutrition is clearly of critical importance to a society that values
socioeconomic rights, it is not a foregone conclusion that the state’s limited resources should be directed towards providing school lunches rather
than, for instance, providing clean water and basic sanitation infrastructure. This type of resource allocation is often undertaken by the political
branches of government in other countries— and, for the most part, in
India. The Indian Court, however, has read the socioeconomic Directive
Principles to require minimum priority levels for developmental goals, and
has held the state to those constitutional requirements.
However, Professor Rehan Abeyratne suggests that expansive judgments might actually enhance perceptions of democratic and constitutional legitimacy in the unique context of public concerns about
government corruption and frustration with persistent poverty in India.118
The Indian Court’s active role in enforcing the government’s socioeconomic obligations made it incredibly popular and reassured citizens that
the Court would hold their elected officials to account.119 Far from frustrating democratic decision-making, the Court ensured accountability by
enforcing the socioeconomic commitments in the Indian Constitution.
By contrast, the South African Court’s approach poses less of an
obstacle to democratic decision-making, especially if one adopts a concept
of democracy that allows reasonable limitations to the legislature’s discretion. Constitutional systems that involve a bill of rights generally limit the
discretion of the majority to encroach upon individual civil and political
rights. The South African Constitution and the Court’s jurisprudence go
one step further by limiting policymaking discretion when policy fails to
prioritize progressive realization of socioeconomic rights, or where policymaking is procedurally deficient. The South African Court’s reasonableness standard allows significant scope for policymaking discretion and
prioritization, while requiring progressive realization of socioeconomic
rights and procedural steps like public consultation.120 The Court’s reluctance to award individualized relief emphasizes the fact that socioeconomic
rights primarily function as constitutionally derived checks on policymaking in South Africa.
B.

The Contractarian Objection

The second Rawlsian objection identified by Michelman is that the
achievement of socioeconomic rights is difficult to measure, and therefore
118. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 56– 58.
119. Id. at 71.
120. See Davis, supra note 61, at 54– 56.
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including such rights in a constitution clouds citizens’ ability to judge
adherence to the state’s constitutional obligations.121 Michelman suggests
that the state may overcome this objection as well if the state’s obligation is
conceptualized as a duty to use best judgment to promote socioeconomic
rights within a constitutionally restricted policy space, rather than to meet
specific individual entitlements.122 Rational citizens are capable of assessing the state’s fulfillment of its constitutional obligation to act within the
policy space restricted by socioeconomic priorities,123 for example by
assessing the state’s commitment to and achievement of progressive realization of socioeconomic rights.
The South African Court’s reasonableness test seems particularly
appropriate to this concept of contractarian legitimacy through policymakers’ application of best judgment to the achievement of progressive socioeconomic development.124 The Court’s approach defers to policy choices
within constitutionally derived and judicially enforced limits.125 The
Court has invalidated government action only for failing to prioritize those
in most desperate need of the state’s protection of socioeconomic rights,126
and has accepted the state’s policy choices where the decision-making procedure included engagement with the public.127 The Court’s reading of
South Africa’s socioeconomic rights enforces the outer bounds of legitimate policy choice, rather than creating concrete but indeterminate obligations that voters would have difficulty assessing as predicted by the
contractarian objection.
The Indian Court’s expansive judgments might cloud citizens’ ability
to assess the state’s achievement of socioeconomic rights by suggesting the
existence of indeterminate but concrete obligations on the part of the state,
arising from the Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution.128 On the
other hand, orders like those granted in the “Right to Food” Litigation129
create unambiguous and measurable obligations on the part of the state,
which reasonable citizens can use to measure the state’s achievement of
socioeconomic rights.130 If the Court were to provide such detailed policy
directives in all areas touched by the socioeconomic rights enumerated in
121. See Michelman, supra note 22, at 23, 35– 36.
122. Id. at 37– 39; see also Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 25– 26; Mureinik, supra note 4,
at 467.
123. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 25.
124. See Fredman, supra note 4, at 175– 80 (suggesting that judicial deference can
serve the purposes of socioeconomic rights by allowing the state to apply positive discrimination to achieve transformative goals).
125. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 21– 22.
126. See, e.g., Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 41
(S. Afr.).
127. See Residents of Joe Slovo Community v. Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454
(CC) at para. 117 (S. Afr.).
128. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 66.
129. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India) and
subsequent interim orders, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html.
130. See Legal Action: Supreme Court Orders, RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN (Aug. 19,
2016), http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html (listing and describing interim orders).
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the Indian Constitution, however, it would leave little scope for democratic
decision-making and could burden the state with unattainable outcome
obligations. The Court’s guidance therefore provides measurable criteria
for the achievement of some socioeconomic rights but not others.
If the Indian public view the Indian Court as filling the vacuum of
socioeconomic achievement left by corruption, however, its intensive oversight could legitimize and help to realize the transformative agenda of the
Indian Constitution.131 In addition to creating and enforcing bounds to
the acceptable policy space that voters can use to measure achievement of
socioeconomic rights, orders like those in the “Right to Food” Litigation
oblige the state to fulfill its role in leading socioeconomic development, in
spite of fears of corruption.
C.

Achievement of Socioeconomic Rights

The South African and Indian Constitutions reflect concerted transformative projects developed during difficult transitions from oppressive
regimes to open and democratic societies. The drafting projects in both
countries involved debates about how best to structure these transformative projects in their new constitutions so as to guarantee results, or at least
oblige the state to seriously pursue the progressive realization of socioeconomic rights.132 An assessment of the legitimacy of these constitutions
and their socioeconomic protections must therefore reflect to some degree
the achievement of socioeconomic transformation in each country over the
following decades.
Professor Eric Christiansen suggests that we adopt modest expectations for socioeconomic achievements through judicial enforcement.133
He points out the impossibility of comparing socioeconomic development
to the counterfactual: transformation that could have been achieved without the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in a constitution or absent judicial enforcement.134 He also notes that objections to justiciable
socioeconomic rights as intrusions upon legislative competence predict, at
most, supplemental and marginal contributions by courts.135 In fact, a
modest contribution by judicial enforcement to the realization of socioeconomic rights would help alleviate one of the Rawlsian objections to constitutional socioeconomic rights by preserving the primary role of the elected
branches of government.
With these qualifications in mind, the South African and Indian
Courts have achieved several concrete advancements for socioeconomic
rights. For example, in Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign
(2002),136 the South African Court caused a reversal of policy that resulted
in the distribution of antiretroviral drugs to mothers living with HIV, rely131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 69– 71.
See supra Part III.
See Christiansen, supra note 5, at 396– 97.
Id.
Id. at 397.
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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ing on the right to health and the rights of children as protected by Articles
27 and 28 of the South African Constitution.137 And as Professor Christiansen writes: “At the very least, the [South African] Court’s jurisprudence
has been clearly successful on a symbolic level. By hearing claims and
evaluating government actions against the backdrop of constitutional
social welfare protections, the Court reinforces the South African vision of
substantive equality.”138 The Indian Court has also played a symbolic role
in legitimizing the Indian Constitution by enforcing the socioeconomic
obligations of the state despite perceptions of corruption.139 The India
Court has contributed to (led, even) concrete, substantial progress towards
the achievement of universal access to basic nutrition through its interim
orders in the “Right to Food” Litigation.140
V.

Towards a Model for Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Socioeconomic Rights

One preliminary lesson from the example of the Indian Court’s
enforcement of socioeconomic rights is that constitutional language will
not necessarily determine the scope and nature of judicial enforcement of
socioeconomic rights.141 The Indian Court found a way to enforce the
socioeconomic Directive Principles, despite plain language in Article 37
that they “shall not be enforceable by any court,”142 by reading into the
Fundamental Right to life a right to “live with human dignity” and
expanding that substantive standard to include rights protected by the
Directive Principles.143 The Court also undertook significant procedural
reforms and revised common law rules of standing to improve access to
judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights.144 Achieving a system of
judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights is, therefore, as much a project for the courts themselves as it is for constitution drafters.
The Indian Court’s willingness to engage in policy design145 may
seem a dramatic departure from the tradition of judicial restraint, but in a
quieter way the South African Court’s socioeconomic rights jurisprudence
is equally extraordinary. The South African Court offers deference
to reasonable policy choices, but it has gone further than the Indian
Court by suggesting process requirements for socioeconomic policy
137. See id.; Christiansen, supra note 5, at 398– 99.
138. Christiansen, supra note 5, at 398.
139. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 56– 58.
140. See supra notes 98– 100 and accompanying text.
141. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 7.
142. INDIA CONST. art. 37.
143. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 SCR 516, 529
(India); Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCR 67, 103 (India); see
Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 7.
144. See supra Part IV.A.
145. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India) and
subsequent interim orders, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html; Legal
Action: Supreme Court Orders, RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www
.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html.
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development.146
Each system offers distinct benefits. The Indian Court’s extension of
standing147 seems especially appropriate for the enforcement of socioeconomic rights. Those who have suffered violations of their socioeconomic
rights will very often be the most marginalized members of a society, lacking access to institutional knowledge and resources. Allowing public interest litigation on their behalf is absolutely crucial in any system designed to
vindicate socioeconomic rights through judicial enforcement.
The South African Court’s reluctance to provide individual remedies148 appears to be prudent, if frustrating for victims of socioeconomic
rights violations. This general rule alleviates some of the concerns about
the burden of meeting socioeconomic rights obligations on the state’s
resources, while requiring policy reforms through regular consultative
processes would preserve the separation of powers between the Court and
the legislature. There may be exceptions to the general rule, moreover,
where justice demands.149
From the perspective of the Rawlsian objections to constitutional
socioeconomic rights,150 the South African Court’s usual deference to
political policy choices ameliorates the concern raised by the democratic
objection that judicial interpretation will occupy the field of social and economic policy.151 Constitutional democracy by its nature presupposes
some limits to majoritarian rule, and while constitutional socioeconomic
rights may tighten these limits, a general rule of deference to legislative and
executive policy-making provides significant space.152 By contrast, the
Indian Court’s approach in the “Right to Food” Litigation153 significantly
restrains the government’s discretion to reach policy decisions regarding
the allocation of resources.154 If the Court were to apply this approach to
enforce a wide range of socioeconomic rights, it might run the risk of closing off too much space for political decision-making (and requiring allocation of a significant proportion of the state’s resources), undermining
political responsiveness and accountability.155 However, the Indian Court
can ameliorate this risk if the Court limits this approach to remedies in
egregious cases of government inaction.
146. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA
208 (CC) at paras. 16– 22 (S. Afr.).
147. See S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 SCR 365 at para. 17 (India).
148. See, e.g., Nokotyana v. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312
(CC) at para. 54 (S. Afr.).
149. See, e.g., Njongi v. Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (4) SA 237 (CC) at
para. 60 (S. Afr.).
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at
para. 29 (S. Afr.); supra Part II(b).
152. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 21– 22.
153. See, for example, PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001)
(India) and subsequent interim orders, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html
154. See Legal Action: Supreme Court Orders, RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN (last updated
28 Feb. 2013), http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html.
155. See Michelman, supra note 22, at 32– 33.
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On the other hand, the Indian Court’s hands-on approach in the
“Right to Food” Litigation provides a detailed, substantive standard against
which citizens can assess the government’s achievement of its obligations,
alleviating the contractarian objection that socioeconomic rights are too
indeterminate for citizens to assess their fulfillment.156 However, the
South African Court’s reasonableness standard for reviewing the consistency of policies with socioeconomic rights probably offers a less detailed
but sufficient standard against which to assess the state’s respect and fulfillment of these rights.157 The contractarian objection drops away if
socioeconomic rights are conceived of as comprehensible limits to the
range of legitimate policy choices, rather than achievement requirements.158 So long as policy falls within this bounded space, government
action is sufficiently consistent with its obligations. The South African
Court’s interpretation of constitutional socioeconomic rights provides precisely such a space for political decision-making, bounded by the limitations of reasonableness in light of the country’s constitutional
commitments.
The South African Court’s insistence on process159 is intriguing,
because it could suggest a process-driven model for judging the consistency of policy with constitutional socioeconomic rights. Instead of measuring policy outcomes against some substantive legal standard for
socioeconomic rights, the courts could require procedural safeguards in
policy development to ensure that constitutional socioeconomic rights are
given their proper weight in the deliberative process. These safeguards
could take the form of requiring some form of public consultation in the
development of social and economic policy,160 creating and consulting
with expert commissions on socioeconomic rights with a mandate to study
policy proposals and make recommendations, and deliberation regarding
whether policy will affect vulnerable groups disproportionately.161
One final lesson from a study of the South African and Indian experiences with judicial enforcement of constitutional socioeconomic rights is
that both Courts have resoundingly disproven concerns about justiciability
raised during the constitutional debates. During the certification stage of
the South African constitutional project, when the government presented
the proposed constitution to the South African Court, two concerns related
to the justiciability of socioeconomic rights were raised: first, that judicial
enforcement of socioeconomic rights would violate the principle of separa156. See supra Part II.B.
157. See Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
158. See supra Part II.B.
159. See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (3)
SA 208 (CC) at paras. 16– 22 (S. Afr.).
160. In Joe Slovo, the South African Court held that the consultative process provided
sufficient protection of socioeconomic rights. 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) at para. 117 (S.
Afr.).
161. See Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 99 (S.
Afr.).
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tion of powers, and second, that courts are of limited competence to assess
policy decisions.162 Time and experience have vindicated the South African Court’s rejection of these concerns.163 The Court’s generally deferential approach poses little threat to the separation of powers, as it restricts
itself to reviewing the sufficiency of government action rather than
attempting to form policy itself.164 The Indian Court went further in the
“Right to Food” Litigation,165 but so far has not sought to fill the policymaking space. With regards to the Courts’ competence to assess policy, both
Courts have proven themselves up to the task of applying judiciable legal
standards to the substance and process of social and economic policy.
Conclusion
The constitutional projects of transitional societies are an opportunity
to experiment with aspirational theories of government, but more importantly they serve as a critical step towards establishing the legitimacy of a
new regime. Choices about constitutional structure shape the developing
relationship between a society and its government. They also shape the
role that the judicial system will play in mediating that relationship.
The constitutions of India and South Africa both emerged from popular movements opposed to economically oppressive regimes. Socioeconomic rights in some form were absolute political imperatives in both
states post-transition, but the role of these rights in the emerging constitutions, as well as their judicial enforcement, were hardly foregone conclusions. Advocates faced principled opponents to the constitutionalization
of socioeconomic rights, who believed that their inclusion would undermine important principles of constitutional democracy. The experience of
both countries has demonstrated, however, that such rights can play a crucial role in the transformative agenda of societies emerging from oppression. The Indian and South African experiments with constitutional
socioeconomic rights were both symbolic of, and intended to contribute to,
social and economic transformation.
A comparison of the divergent ways in which these two countries
framed socioeconomic rights and the jurisprudence of the courts may provide lessons for societies considering amendments to more entrenched
constitutions as well. Both courts have adopted legal standards and developed practices that give socioeconomic rights the force and predictability
of law, while preserving plenty of space for democratic decision-making.
The inclusion of socioeconomic rights in both the Indian and South African constitutions also serves as a signal of the political commitment made
by the framers to the just and principled use of social and economic policy
for future growth.
162. See supra Part III.B.
163. See supra Part IV.B.
164. See Abeyratne, supra note 2, at 20– 22.
165. PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India) and subsequent interim orders, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html.
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